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Abstract: The editor discusses xenophobia and conflict resolution in a post-two-superpower world. 
 
By now it's de rigueur to note that with the collapse of a two-superpower world, the number and 
severity of conflicts fueled by nationalism, racism, ethnocentrism, and other virulent components of 
political conflict have increased. Somewhat less de rigueur would be a clinical analysis of one 
psychological substrate of the above, xenophobia. A clinical definition of this term might be nonadaptive 
anxiety, conscious and unconscious, towards people and cultures different than one's own.  
 
The term nonadaptive in this definition denotes significantly hindering attaining basic goals, e.g., 
satisfying needs for food, water, and shelter, for modulating physical, psychological, and/or spiritual 
pain, and for some sense of continuity within the current of human events. (Two caveats here. First, 
xenophobia often does satisfy this last need, at least in the short-term. Second, basic goals might be 
very different than those above, for some individuals and groups. In other words, Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs might be inverted, subverted, perverted, and triangulated in a manner applauded by a certain 
U.S. presidential consultant.)  
 
The definition's referent of conscious anxiety can be directly expressed in avoidance of what is different 
or in preemptive violence. The referent, unconscious anxiety, can be expressed in projection of negative 
self-attributes towards others who are different. In xenophobia, the conscious and unconscious 
anxieties are largely not based on realistic fears. (A caveat: differentiating xenophobia from realistic fear 
in specific cases--e.g., Bosnia, Burundi, Boston-- may be more a matter of the observer's or analyst's 
projective processes than political psychological analysis. Or, perhaps the discipline of political 
psychology is a collective projection-- or worse a projective identification by political psychologists.)  
 
It follows, if the clinical analogy is continued, that the premier approach to attenuate xenophobia during 
official and unofficial contacts between, within, and among combatants, from low-level talks to full-
blown negotiations, might contain cognitive and behavioral techniques similar to those effective in 
attenuating other phobias. These techniques would include exposure to phobic objects, restructuring of 
anxiogenic cognitions, substitution of anxiolytic cognitions, social skills training, and related role playing.  
 
One difference with clinical therapy would be that many pertinent roles would not have to be simulated. 
(In fact, the combatant contacts can be conceived of as roles, and often are by the combatants 
themselves.) Another difference would be that in contrast to the often tender-minded context of 
psychotherapy, the above-mentioned cognitive and behavioral techniques would be rigorously 
implemented in a tough-minded manner and placed within a protocol delineating the sequence of 
agenda items as part of the preparations for more formal contacts. (Here tender-minded and tough-
minded harbor the meanings of either William James or Hans Eysenck.)  
 
The cognitive-behavioral approach advocated here might be less likely to exacerbate social relations 
among negotiators and hinder conflict resolution than many other approaches. Some formal allowance 
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for emotional venting--be it conceived as catharsis, implosion, paradoxical intention, or desensitization-- 
could even further conflict resolution.  
 
Yet the realism in this overall approach allows rapacious, power-hungry interlocutors to more effectively 
seek a balance of power, hegemony, or outright unconditional surrender and destruction of their foes 
without the nonadaptive hindrance of xenophobia. Thus this approach, unlike may others, does not 
assume that ultimately the participants do not desire conflict and unrest, but rather crave faith, hope, 
and charity. It is not founded on a Pollyanna hypothesis requiring Saddam Hussein, Hafez el Assad, Li 
Peng, Mobutu Sese Seko, and Augusto Pinochet to be merely repressed flower children. (Remember the 
Reagan Administration's cake for the Iranians with the message that they all were "people of the 
Book?") Intriguingly, the promise of being able to achieve one's initial power goals more effectively may 
coopt leaders to participate in negotiations that may moderate those very goals. (See Heimberg et al. 
(1990.) Cognitive behavioral group treatment for social phobia. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 14, 1-
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